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Abstract The carceral boom in post-Civil Rights America results not from profit-
seeking but from state-crafting. Accordingly, we must slay the chimera of the ‘‘Prison
Industrial Complex’’ and forsake its derived tale of the ‘‘Prisoner Reentry Industry.’’
This murky economic metaphor is doubly misleading: first, most released convicts
experience not reentry but ongoing circulation between the prison and their dispos-
sessed neighborhoods; second, the institutions entrusted with supervising them are not
market operators but elements of the bureaucratic field as characterized by Pierre
Bourdieu. Post-custodial supervision is a ceremonial component of ‘‘prisonfare,’’
which complements ‘‘workfare’’ through organizational isomorphism, and partakes
of the neoliberal reengineering of the state. Reentry outfits are not an antidote to but an
extension of punitive containment as government technique for managing problem
categories and territories in the dualizing city. To capture the glaring economic
irrationality and bureaucratic absurdities of the oversight of felons behind as well
as beyond bars, our theoretical inspiration should come not from the radical critique
of capitalism but from the neo-Durkheimian sociology of organization and the
neo-Weberian theory of the state as a classifying and stratifying agency.
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The varied papers gathered by Douglas Thompkins and his collaborators in the
special Forum of Dialectical Anthropology on prison reentry offer a kaleidoscopic
set of views ‘‘from below’’ of the post-custodial trajectories of American convicts
that usefully complement the reigning views ‘‘from above’’ of mainstream
criminology, technical penology, and policy-oriented evaluations (e.g., Seiter and
Kadela 2003; Petersilia 2003; Travis 2005; Hattery and Smith 2010). But their
potential contribution to the much needed rethinking of this urgent sociopolitical
issue and its anthropological ramifications is amputated by three serious conceptual
flaws. The first is the impulsive embrace of the demonic myth of the ‘‘Prison
Industrial Complex’’ (hereafter PIC), which confuses the reengineering of the state
in its dealings with the poor in the post-industrial era with a profit-seeking endeavor.
The second is the correlative and inconsiderate invocation of a ‘‘Prison Reentry
Industry’’ (hereafter PRI), when the management of felons after their release
pertains to bureaucratic ceremony rather than economy. The third is the crippling
isolation of penal trajectories from the gamut of state policies that jointly determine
the life options of convicts both before and after confinement, and especially from
the regressive transformation of welfare policies (embracing income support,
housing, education, job training, health, etc.) that has accompanied, amplified, and
complemented criminal justice changes over the past three decades. I briefly take up
each of these points in seriatim before urging a reorientation of critical approaches
to penal policy stressing the perverse circularity, economic absurdity, and political
rationale of penalization as a technique for governing urban marginality, as well
as the need to integrate ‘‘workfare’’ and ‘‘prisonfare’’ into a single framework for
analysis and action.
1 Slay the chimera of the ‘‘Prison Industrial Complex’’
The editors of the forum and many of the contributors who have come out of the
penitentiary frame their (post)custodial experiences and critiques by reference to the
‘‘Prison Industrial Complex,’’ an expression that came into vogue among America’s
criminal justice activists and progressive scholars and journalists after the mid-
1990s (Donziger 1996; Davis 1998; Schlosser 1998). The term is, as is too often the
case, left undefined and unexplicated, as if its emotional charge and political motive
provided sufficient warrant to invoke it. Problem is, to the degree that it can be
specified, this wooly notion turns out to be internally incoherent and externally
disconnected from the structure and dynamics of carceral expansion in the post-
Civil rights era. Briefly put, four defects suggest that the chimera of PIC must be
slayed,1 and the empirical trends and social dilemmas posed by the peregrination of
convicts after prison recast as pertaining to the revamping of the state in both its
social and penal components (Wacquant 2009).
1 A chimera is a fire-breathing beast in ancient Greek mythology (first described in Homer’s Odyssey),
sporting the hind of a snake, the body of a goat, and the head of a lion. It is an apt image for the fearsome
triadic combination of astringent justice officials, tough-on-crime politicians and media, and booming
private corporations which advocates of PIC imagine propel prison trends.
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1.1. PIC is based on a loose analogy with MIC, the ‘‘Military Industrial
Complex’’ alleged to have driven the expansion of America’s warfare economy
during the Cold War era (e.g., Gilmore 2009). Aside from the dubious analytic
validity of a notion coined by a speechwriter for a despondent President
Eisenhower on the occasion of his farewell address,2 the claim that PIC parallels
MIC in handling security on the home front for the benefit of corporations
founders on the fact that there is no justice equivalent for the Pentagon. Whereas
the federal Department of Defense is a single decision-making center that
manages a single budget and implements military policy through hierarchical
command, there exists no bureaucratic lever to direct crime control and submit
it uniformly to private interests. Legal punishment in America is meted
out through a highly decentralized, disjointed, and multilayered patchwork of
agencies. The police, courts, and corrections are separate government institutions,
subjected to disparate political, funding, and bureaucratic imperatives, that are
poorly coordinated and whose relations are riven with tension and conflicts
(Neubauer 2005: 6–7)—to say nothing of probation, parole, halfway houses, drug
treatment facilities, and assorted outfits entrusted with handling convicts after
their release.
In addition to being weakly connected to each other, each of the three
components of the penal chain is deeply fragmented across geographic space and
political scale. Over 18,000 local and state law-enforcement agencies decide their
policing strategies at ground level; some 2,341 distinct prosecutors’ offices set their
judicial priorities; thousands of counties run their own jail while the fifty states and
the federal government each run their separate prison system (and release programs)
with little regard for what other administrative units are doing. Moreover, because
they are located at the back-end of the penal chain, prisons depend for their key
operational inputs on measures and processes set in motion by the police and the
courts, over whom they have virtually no influence. The incipient ‘‘federalization of
crime’’ (Waisman 1994), which provides a measure of coordination, has been
largely undermined by the diversification of prosecution and corrections philoso-
phies across jurisdictions after the abandonment of indeterminate sentencing (Tonry
2000). In organizational and political terms, then, the government function of
punishment is decentralized, fragmented, and horizontal, that is, the polar opposite
of the military. The connection between MIC and PIC is purely rhetorical; it
pertains to metaphor and not to analogy. Even if some malevolent alliance of
politicians, corporate owners, and correctional officials wished to harness carceral
institutions to the pecuniary aims of ‘‘multinational globalization’’ and foster ‘‘a
project in racialization and macro injustice’’ (Brewer and Heitzeg 2008: 625), they
would lack the bureaucratic means to do so. Rather than explaining it, PIC precludes
posing the crucial question of how and why a de facto national policy of penal
expansion has emerged out of the organizational hodge-podge formed by criminal
justice institutions.
2 See Moskos (1974) for an early critique pointing to the multiple flaws and limitations of the notion of
‘‘Military Industrial Complex.’’
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1.2. Advocates of PIC maintain that, due to its stupendous enlargement,
incarceration plays a major role in the contemporary capitalist economy of the
United States, spurring the accumulation process by offering choice opportunities
for profit, an endlessly renewed pool of superexploitable labor, and even the
valorization of ‘‘surplus land’’ in rural areas (Gilmore 2007). Nationally prisons
are said to ‘‘constitute an ever growing source of capitalist growth’’ (Davis 2003:
96) while internationally ‘‘the rise of industrialized punishment has woven mass
incarceration into the fabric of the global economy’’ (Sudbury 2004: 13). This
claim borders on the absurd. While it is true that the corrections budget of the
United States has increased to outlandish proportions by historical and interna-
tional standards, it still makes up a tiny and negligible chunk of the domestic
economy. The $70 billion the United States spent in 2008 to operate its jails and
prisons (adding up the budgets of counties, states, and the federal government)
amounts to less than one-half of one per cent of its Gross Domestic Product of
$14.4 trillion.
To realize the exaggeration entailed in asserting that prisons have become
central to American capitalism (to say nothing of world capitalism), consider that
the country’s annual expenditures on penal confinement come to about twice the
sums Americans disburse for ‘‘chocolate, gum, cereal bars and sugar confec-
tionery’’ (which together generated revenues of $32.9 billion in 2008). They
equal the size of the personal products industry which includes ‘‘over the counter
healthcare, skincare, haircare, makeup, fragrances and others’’ (with sales of
$73.6 billion); and they come to just over one-half of the monies Americans
devote annually to soft drinks (with $128 billion).3 How credible is the notion
that the ‘‘Soda Industrial Complex’’ has become a locomotive for the American
economy? Prisons have grown as a government function and a political
institution, as a vehicle for regulating marginality and staging the authority of the
Leviathan, but they remain negligible in terms of economic weight and thus
nonexistent as a vehicle for profit on a national scale—and a fortiori on the
global stage.
1.3. A related staple of PIC is the strident denunciation of the exploitation of
convict labor. The magazine article by Mike Davis that introduced the term
‘‘prison industrial complex’’ to readers of The Nation in 1995 (in quotation marks
and without any explication) was appositely entitled ‘‘Hell Factories in the
Field.’’4 Nearly every piece published since by advocates of the PIC perspective
complains in florid language that prisons are being turned into ‘‘sweatshops’’ and
inmates reduced to ‘‘neo-slavery,’’ as they are pushed into the clutches of
capitalist firms eager to recruit pliant low-wage workers behind bars who require
3 The economic data in this section are taken from the corresponding ‘‘Industry Profile’’ in Datamonitor,
Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (retrieved 9 October 2010).
4 This title is curious since Davis does not describe carceral production units, noting instead ‘‘the drastic
shortage of work for prisoners, condemning nearly half the inmate population to serve their sentences idly
in their cells watching infinities of television’’ (Davis 1995: 230). The same Mike Davis compares
California prisons to ‘‘slave plantations’’ in his front-cover endorsement of Ruth Gilmore’s book Golden
Gulag, even though Gilmore concedes in the book that ‘‘most prisoners are idle’’ and that ‘‘those who
work do so for a public agency’’ (Gilmore 2007: 21).
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no medical coverage, no benefits, no vacation pay, and no pension—as if such
employment terms were difficult to impose on the contingent workforce outside.
The list of companies said to use prison and jail employees is then rolled out:
Wal-Mart, Dell, TWA, Toys ‘‘R’’ Us, Chevron, IBM, Boeing, Nitendo, Starbucks,
Victoria’s Secret, and so on. The fact that it comprises a Who’s Who of corporate
America from across economic sectors is presented as definitive proof that
inmates have been turned into a coerced reserve army of labor. But the tireless
repetition of this list hides the fact that none of these companies ever made more
than an incidental or accidental use of prison labor (typically a few hundred staff,
hired for short stints through contractors); that none of the industries they lead
relies even marginally on convict workers; and that the overwhelming majority of
inmates suffer not from labor enslavement but from numbing idleness (Wacquant
2009: 181–184).
Indeed, at peak use around 2002, fewer than 5,000 inmates were employed by
private firms, amounting to one-quarter of one per cent of the carceral population.
As for the roughly 8% of convicts who toil for state and federal industries under
lock, they are ‘‘employed’’ at a loss to correctional authorities in spite of massive
subsidies, guaranteed sales to a captive market of public administrations, and
exceedingly low wages (averaging well under a dollar an hour).5 Put simply, the
notion that convicts constitute a vulnerable labor pool is a figment of the political
imagination: it is the dream of advocates of the far Right, who wish to turn
penitentiaries into ‘‘factories behind bars’’ to fight idleness and lower the carceral
bill, and the nightmare of critics of the far Left who fear that carceral factories are
already humming. In reality, for a plethora of stubborn economic, legal, and cultural
reasons, prison employment on a mass scale has vanished and is a nonstarter in the
liberal societies of the advanced West, including the United States (Van Zyl Smit
and Dunkel 1999).6
1.4. PIC maintains that the profit-motive drives and distorts punishment, on
grounds that firms have inserted themselves into an ‘‘industrialized’’ penal process
as suppliers of correctional wares and services, designers and builders of prisons,
and even managers of for-profit facilities. But there is nothing new or peculiar in
this: the intercession of commercial operators is the norm in the provision of public
goods in America. Owing to its weak bureaucratic capacities, there is virtually no
5 Compare these figures (under 5,000 employed by firms and an estimated 90,000 by government entities,
fewer than half of them black, and all working voluntarily) to this statement, typical of the hyperbole of
PIC advocates: ‘‘Close to a million young Black men suffer the exploitative regime of the modern prison-
industrial complex, where their virtually unpaid labor is coerced and extracted for corporate profits…
This is a situation that resurrects the biophysics of spatio-temporal reduction imposed by slavery and
segregation’’ (Juan 2005: 70).
6 Britain’s new conservative government will soon (re)discover this as it tries to implement its surreal
plan to put English and Welsh inmates to work 40 hours a week (to gain job skills and pay for victim
reparations and support). Already, the country’s Prison Governors’ Association has warned that custodial
facilities are not equipped for production; that many inmates are not motivated to do drab work and suffer
from serious substance abuse and mental impairments; and that employment will require added
supervisory staff, whereas the correctional budget and staff are set to decrease by one-third. Not to
mention that providing carceral jobs for convicts will hardly please the 2.4 million Britons who are
presently unemployed on the outside (nearly one million of them for over a year).
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major function of government—education, welfare, health care, housing, transpor-
tation, infrastructure, etc.—that does not entail extensive recourse to private entities.
In his path-breaking book The Divided Welfare State, Jacob Hacker (2002: 6) has
shown that American social policy is distinctive among advanced countries, not for
its levels of protection and spending (as commonly believed) but for its long-
standing reliance on the private sector to deliver protection against life risks through
a ‘‘hybrid system of social benefits.’’ For instance, two-thirds of Americans get
medical coverage through employer-based health plans offered by insurance
companies that are closely regulated and heavily subsidized by government through
tax concessions. So much so that private expenditures accounted for 55% of total
health care spending in the country circa 2000. The same is true of aid to the poor:
long before the ‘‘end of welfare as we know it’’ in 1996, the lion’s share of benefits
was delivered through nonprofit and commercial outfits (to the tune of 60% of
expenditures in 1980). The ‘‘marketization of welfare’’ has intensified over the past
two decades with the broad expansion of outsourcing for the supervision of
workfare recipients, the spread of vouchers, and ‘‘the blurring of the distinction
between nonprofit and for-profit providers’’ (Katz 2001: 148–155). Even post-
secondary education fits this pattern: 36% of the $375 billion paid out to degree-
granting tertiary institutions in 2006–2007 went to private schools (Institute of
Education Science 2009: Table 9).
Ironically, the one signal exception to this ‘‘mixed economy’’ of government
services is incarceration. In direct contradiction to PIC, what distinguishes
punishment in America—as in other advanced societies—is the degree to which it
has remained stubbornly and distinctively public. After two decades of gusting
ideological winds at their back, favorable economic and budgetary circumstances,
frantic lobbying, and the pressing need to expand custodial capacity given grotesque
overcrowding in existing facilities, private prison firms managed to capture only 6%
of the ‘‘carceral market’’ at their peak in 2000 (one-fourth of their projected goal of
1995). The bursting of the stock market bubble of 2001 nearly destroyed the sector—
its leaders owed their survival to magnanimous new contracts to house immigrant
convicts under supervision of the INS—and their share is unlikely to grow much
further. As for the overseas market, it is equally limited and stagnant; private
corrections get a lot of headlines around the world, but it remains a remarkably
marginal ‘‘industry’’ composed of a few small firms whose viability is a brittle
by-product of the shifting ideological favors and bureaucratic ineptitude of states.7
Incarceration is far and away the one canonical government function that remains
firmly in the grip of public officials because penal confinement does not just serve to
curb disorder, discipline the unruly, and warehouse the supernumerary. It also
7 In 2009, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), by far the largest of only four international firms
of incarceration with half of the planet’s private prison ‘‘beds,’’ sported a profit of $155 million on global
sales of $1.7 billion. By comparison, the world’s top corporations tallied profits of $10 to $20 billion on
sales ranging from $200 to $400 billion. CCA controls assets of $3 billion and employs 17,000; leading
multinational companies own assets in the hundreds of billions of dollars (excluding financial
conglomerates, whose assets range from $1 to $2 trillion) and employ hundreds of thousands (e.g.,
Wal-Mart has 1.8 million employees for sales of $408 billion generating a profit of $14 billion; General
Electric employs 307,000 for sales of $156 billion and a profit of $11 billion). It is hard to see how CCA,
being one-hundredth the size of GE, could be playing more than a decorative role in the global economy.
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anchors a core civic theater for dramatizing collective norms, asserting political
authority, and staging the sovereignty of the state. The prison is a core political
institution and not an economic one.8 PIC obscures the political logic of penal
expansion because it inverts cause and consequence: the ring of ‘‘prison profiteers’’
(Herivel and Wright 2007) has enlarged because the penal state has expanded to
gargantuan proportions, and not the other way around.
2 Prisoner ‘‘reentry’’ pertains to bureaucratic ceremony and not industrial
economy
The penitentiary has returned to the institutional forefront of the advanced societies,
not because of its ‘‘comprehensive corporatization’’—Angela Davis (Davis and
Shaylor 2001: 4)—but because the government has shifted from the social welfare
to the punitive management of urban marginality through the simultaneous rolling
out of disciplinary workfare and neutralizing prisonfare. The penal boom results not
from profit-seeking but from state-crafting. Accordingly, it is doubly misleading to
invoke murky economic metaphors to speak of a ‘‘Prisoner Reentry Industry,’’ as
the Forum in Dialectical Anthropology does.
2.1. It is misleading to speak of a reentry industry insofar as the vast majority of
former convicts experience not reentry but ongoing circulation between the two
poles of a continuum of forced confinement formed by the prison and the dilapidated
districts of the dualizing metropolis (Wacquant 2010a) that are the latter’s primary
recruiting grounds, as the state deploys the criminal justice apparatus to contain the
disorders spawned by economic deregulation and welfare retrenchment in the lower
regions of social and physical space. Proof is that seven in ten convicts coming out
of the gates of American prisons are rearrested and over half of them are thrown
back behind bars within 3 years (Langan and Levin 2002).9 For them, ‘‘reentry’’
into society would be more accurately described as prelude to another entry into
the prison. Similarly, the conventional language of ‘‘transition from prison to
community’’ used by practitioners and analysts of ‘‘reentry’’ (e.g., Thompson 2008
for a standard approach) presupposes a clear separation between these two worlds,
whereas they increasingly interpenetrate one another under the current regime of
hyperincarceration targeted at neighborhoods of relegation—not to mention that
these urban wastelands present few of the positive social and moral features
commonly associated with the term ‘‘community.’’ For lower-class black convicts,
who supply the largest contingent of admissions, the bloated prison and the barren
hyperghetto stand in a linked relationship of structural continuity, functional
8 See Wacquant (2009: 287–295, 304–30) for further elaboration. McBride (2007) offers an elegant
statement of a germane position from the standpoint of political theory. Harcourt (2011) sketches a
provocative historical genealogy of the antinomic opposition between the market economy and the penal
state.
9 These figures date from the mid-1990s, concerning convicts released in 1994. Everything suggests that
the recapture rate has increased since, given that the overall supply of criminals has decreased steadily
since. In California, fully three-fourths of the cohorts entering prison around 2000 were composed of
‘‘PVRCs’’ (parole violators returned to custody).
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surrogacy, and cultural syncretism such that, irrespective of their custodial status,
they remain hemmed in social spaces characterized by extreme material denudment,
rampant social suspicion, routine violence, and failing public institutions (Wacquant
2001, 2008: 119–132).
To speak of ‘‘pathways of reintegration’’ (Visher and Travis 2003: 9) disregards the
hard fact that there was no integration prior to incarceration as evidenced by the
social profile of jail detainees in America (Wacquant 2009: 69–72): fewer than half of
them held a full-time job at the time of their arraignment; two-thirds come from
households living under half of the official ‘‘poverty line’’; 87% have no postsec-
ondary education; and four in ten suffer from serious physical and mental disabilities.
Every other jail inmate has an incarcerated family member, and six in ten were
previously incarcerated themselves. How could former prisoners be ‘‘re-integrated’’
when they were never integrated in the first place and when there exists no viable
social structure to accommodate them outside? How could there be ‘‘reentry’’ when
they are enmeshed in a carceral lattice spanning the prison and neighborhoods deeply
penetrated and constantly destabilized by the penal state?
2.2. It is misleading to speak of a reentry industry because the gamut of
institutions entrusted with supervising and supporting convicts after their release
are not economic institutions. The industrial metaphor applied to the processing of
criminals was given its letters of intellectual nobility two decades ago by the
widely read book by criminologist Nils Christie, Crime Control as Industry (1993,
second enlarged edition 1994, third edition 2000, reprinted twice since). Writing
from the vantage point of his native Norway, a country with an inmate population
under 2,300 at the time, where convicted criminals routinely bide their time on a
wait-list for months for a cell to become available in the country’s miniscule
carceral system, and where rehabilitation is a state religion, Christie could not but
be shocked by the mammoth size of America’s custodial population (then
exceeding 1.5 million), its growing reliance on private suppliers and operators, and
its abandonment of correctional treatment for brute neutralization and shrill
retribution. The only way to make sense of the sheer scale and penological
absurdity of American hyperincarceration was to argue that the ‘‘segments of the
population’’ that are ‘‘seen as superfluous,’’ due to their ‘‘inability to participate in
the consumer society,’’ are ‘‘given a use function as raw materials for the control
industry’’ (Christie 2004: 250). But the ‘‘control industry,’’ like the reentry
industry, is not an industry in any meaningful sense of the term. As with PIC, this
economic language obscures that criminal justice outfits are first and foremost
public or parapublic organizations entrusted with delivering sanctions, that is,
components of the penal sector of the bureaucratic field as characterized by Pierre
Bourdieu (1994).
The gamut of organizations that supervise former prisoners after their release and
either assist them in or hinder them from merging into a household, finding housing
and employment, and resolving their medical and other personal troubles (described
in detail by Ross and Richards 2009) do not form an economic sector. They do not
produce or sell goods in an exchange system where price acts as a clearing
mechanism; they do not compete with each other for inputs and vie for segments of
a market; and they do not generate profits that would provide an impetus for
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further expansion.10 They are ‘‘people-processing institutions’’ entrusted with the
management of a tainted population of sub-citizens (owing to the judicial stigma
afflicting them), which seek to achieve changes in their clients ‘‘not by altering basic
personal attributes, but by conferring on them a public status and relocating them in
a new set of social circumstances’’ (Hasenfeld 1972: 256). Now, it is true that
reentry outfits contend with one another for contracts with local authorities and cash
from philanthropic foundations; that they claim to change the attributes of recipients
through moral rearmament, soft skills training, and life-coaching techniques; and
that they experience the daily scramble over bodies as a form of competition with
other human services organizations. But for all the talk of ‘‘marketizing’’ poor
oversight in the post-welfare era, reentry operators remain suppliers of services in a
public monopsony, with the government (and associated charities) as sole buyer.
Their continued functioning hinges not on market efficiency, but on bureaucratic
clientelism and political patronage. The conceptual vocabulary needed to describe,
explain, and eventually transform the institutions handling reentry is not that of the
radical critique of capitalism—and even less so of the loosely associated ‘‘isms’’ of
racism, sexism, and militarism, ritually invoked by the advocates of PIC—but the
tools of the neo-Durkheimian sociology of bureaucratic organization and the neo-
Weberian theory of the state.11
In their classic essay on ‘‘Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,’’ John Meyer
and Brian Rowan (1977: 346) propose that organizations can be arrayed along
a continuum with, at one end, ‘‘production organizations under strong output
controls’’ and, at the other, ‘‘organizations whose success depends on the confidence
and stability achieved by isomorphism with institutional rules.’’ Outfits for post-
custodial supervision clearly belong to the latter type, for which ‘‘activity has ritual
significance: it maintains appearances and validates an organization’’ (Meyer and
Rowan 1977: 354, 355). Such establishments, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 358) point
out, are deeply inefficient, but they survive and even thrive by ‘‘decoupling’’
structure and activities, and by following ‘‘a logic of confidence and good faith’’
whereby ‘‘delegation, professionalization, goal ambiguity, and the elimination of
output data’’ are enrolled to maintain a ‘‘ceremonial fac¸ade’’ (Meyer and Rowan
1977: 358). In short, institutions of penal supervision after incarceration serve
less to ‘‘reintegrate’’ convicts who ‘‘reenter’’ society than to cloak the glaring
irrationality of the policy of penalization of poverty as the nefarious consequences
of hyperincarceration accumulate and fester at the bottom of social and physical
space. Denounced upstream and expunged from the prison itself, the welfarist myth
of rehabilitation is revived and reactivated downstream after custody to help stage
10 Like other compendia on key economic terms, The Oxford Dictionary of Economics defines an
industry as ‘‘a sector of the economy, in which firms use similar factor inputs to make a group of related
products,’’ followed by a second, older, specification: ‘‘A group of sectors, mainly in manufacturing and
construction, typically producing physical goods rather than services.’’
11 The only industry that has grown about ‘‘reentry’’ is the tiny subsector of the publishing world devoted
to the genre of practical ‘‘handbooks’’ and advice manuals aimed at (ex-) convicts and their family and
friends, and the correctional and social work professionals who oversee them after release. See, from the
fast-expanding list of titles typically filled with a mix of sensible pointers, painful anecdotes, and dire
warnings, as well as lyrical invocations of the moral individualism that undergirds the national
commonsense of Americans, Jackson (2008), Bovan (2009), and Booth (2009).
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the resolve of the state to tackle the crime question on an individual, case-by-case
basis. Only now this myth is deployed in a stripped-down, panoptic, and disciplinary
variant high on symbolism and low on substance, guaranteed to have no more than a
marginal impact on the endless recycling of millions of convicts.
For all the excitement it has generated among its advocates since its instigation
around 2004 by the Urban Institute and the Open Society Institute (backed by Soros
monies), the so-called ‘‘reentry movement’’ is but a minor bureaucratic adaptation
to the glaring contradictions of the punitive regulation of poverty. Proof is its
measly funding: the Second Chance Act of 2008, ballyhooed by the bipartisan
political coalition that passed it and the scholars it subsidizes, has an annual budget
of $165 million equal to less than one-quarter of one percent of the country’s
correctional budget. Put differently, it provides the princely sum of $20 monthly per
new convict released, enough to buy them a sandwich each week. If the authorities
were serious about ‘‘reentry,’’ they would allocate twenty to fifty times that amount
at minimum. They would start by reestablishing the previously existing web of
programs that build a bridge back to civilian life—furloughs, educational release,
work release, and half-way houses—which has atrophied over the past two decades
and avoid locating ‘‘reentry services’’ in decrepit facilities located in dangerous and
dilapidated inner-city districts rife with crime and vice (Ross and Richards 2009:
13–15, 48). They would restore the prison college programs that had made the
United States an international leader in higher education behind bars, until convicts
were denied eligibility for Pell Grants in 1994 to feed the vengeful fantasies of the
electorate, even as government studies showed that a college degree is the most
efficacious and cost-effective antidote to reoffending (Page 2004). They would end
the myriad rules that extend penal sanction far beyond prison walls and long after
sentences have been served—such as the statutes barring ‘‘ex-cons’’ from access to
public housing, welfare support, educational grants, and voting—and curtail the
legal disabilities inflicted on their families and intimates (Comfort 2007). They
would restrain and reverse the runaway diffusion of ‘‘rap sheets’’ through
government web sites and private firms offering background checks to employers
and realtors, which fuels criminal discrimination and gravely truncates the life
opportunities of ex-offenders years after they have served their sentence and ‘‘come
clean’’ (Blumstein and Nakamura 2009). They would expand substance abuse
treatment programs both inside and outside prison since the vast majority of
convicts suffer from serious alcohol and drug dependency and yet go untreated by
the millions.12 They would immediately divert low-level offenders who are
mentally ill into medical facilities, instead of continuing to subject them to penal
abuse and medical neglect in carceral facilities, as consistently recommended by
leading public health experts for over two decades (Steadman and Naples 2005).
They would stop the costly and self-defeating policy of returning parolees to
12 Nationwide, the United States spent $468 billion to handle substance abuse and addiction to tobacco,
alcohol, and narcotics in 2005. Less than 2% of that sum went to prevention and treatment (Califano
2009). This imbalance is even more pronounced among addicted convicts both behind and beyond bars:
the California Department of Corrections offers 750 beds in detoxification wards to its 85,000 parolees
known to be alcohol or drug addicts.
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custody for technical violations of the administrative conditions of their release
(Grattet et al. 2008). The list goes on and on.
The twofold point being made here is that, besides serving no productive function,
the ‘‘reentry industry’’ is not an industry by dint of its bureaucratic (il)logic and
artisanal format. This derives from a signal difference between the military and crime
control functions of the state, which PIC and the derivative trope of PRI both ignore
and obscure: warfare is a capital- and technology-intensive activity for which the
Pentagon necessarily depends on private corporations (in the absence of public sector
producers of military wares), whereas justice is a people-intensive activity for which
government officials routinely rely on a myriad public outfits and their extensions
(nonprofit or commercial). Furthermore, these outfits are not geared toward effecting
the ‘‘reintegration’’ of convicts for which budgets, personnel, and political will are
lacking, but to performing a simulacrum of rehabilitation after custody while such
rehabilitation has been jettisoned in custody. In short, prisoner reentry is not an
industry but a bureaucratic charade.
3 Post-custodial supervision is a component of prisonfare, which complements
workfare and partakes of the neoliberal reengineering of the state
Convict reentry programs activated ‘‘downstream’’ are not only tiny in size,
incoherent in design, and grotesquely ineffective—so many properties that would
make them a failed industry if they were indeed one. They are also undermined
at every turn by the broader set of policies that the state deploys ‘‘upstream’’ on
the education, housing, health care, welfare, and labor fronts. In all of these
domains, over the three decades spanning the dismantling of the Fordist-
Keynesian compact, federal and local actions have converged to aggravate
inequality and to entrench racialized deprivation in the city.13 At the same time,
the authorities have swung from the social and medical treatment to the penal
management of poverty, thus directly fueling admission into the ballooning
carceral system and sowing such instability in the nether zones of social and
physical space as to render the ‘‘reintegration’’ of convicts after their sentence is
served an impractical proposition.
3.1. The multisided and multiscalar involvement of the state in the production and
regulation of urban marginality implies that, to properly anatomize the structure and
functioning of post-custodial oversight, we must effect three analytic moves: (1)
forsake a narrow focus on individual ‘‘reentry’’—which, for most convicts, is just
a step toward repeat incarceration—to capture extended life sequences spanning
13 Wacquant (2008) provides an empirical demonstration in the case of Chicago and Brady (2009) a
rigorous international comparison showing, first, that inequality and poverty in the advanced societies are
tightly correlated and, second, how both result from power relations and political coalitions
institutionalized in the state, not from the behavioral failings or cultural patterns of the lower class (as
alleged by those scatty sociologists who periodically rediscover with wonderment the mysterious
magnetism of the ‘‘culture of poverty’’).
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trajectories before and after prison, using the lineage as unit of analysis and tracking
the peregrinations of its members across multiple spells of penal entailment14; (2) link
social and penal policy since these two variants of poverty policy have become
interwoven and coordinated under the same punitive philosophy of moral behavior-
ism; (3) heed the symbolic purposes and ceremonial logic of post-prison supervision,
as opposed to its imagined economic rationale, and trace its socially disintegrative and
criminogenic effects as well as its proclaimed supportive role.
The sudden policy and scholarly infatuation with ‘‘reentry’’ as individualized
response to the collective predicament posed by the mass return of convicts to the
dispossessed districts of the metropolis must not hide the fact that such programs are
an integral component of prisonfare, defined as the rolling out of the police, the
courts, and custodial institutions and their extensions to contain the brewing urban
disorders that the state itself has spawned or aggravated by retracting the social
safety net and deregulating the low-wage labor market (Wacquant 2009a:16–17,
58–69, 98–109, 135–146). Reentry programs are not an antidote to but an extension
of punitive containment as government technique for managing problem categories
and territories in the dualizing city. They are not a remedy to, but part and parcel of
the institutional machinery of hyperincarceration (Cohen 1985), whose reach they
stretch beyond bars and over the lifecourse of convicts by keeping them under the
stern watch and punctilious injunctions of criminal justice even as they return to
their barren neighborhoods. Reentry must therefore be understood as an element in
the redrawing of the perimeter, priorities, and modalities of action of the state as a
stratifying and classifying agency and not as an ‘‘industry’’ geared to ‘‘reintegrat-
ing’’ a marginalized population that was never socially and economically integrated
to start with.
3.2. The recent revamping of post-custodial supervision partakes of the neoliberal
reengineering of the state whereby restrictive workfare and expansive prisonfare
meet and mesh to impose the discipline of fragmented wage work onto the post-
industrial poor, neutralize their more disruptive elements, and project the authority
of the Leviathan onto the stage of law and order (Wacquant 2010b). Indeed, the
renovated reentry chain is for lower-class criminal men, the penal counterpart and
complement to punitive workfare as the new face of public aid for derelict women
and children—who happen to be their mothers, sisters, wives, and offspring, since
the welfare and criminal justice arms of the state fasten onto the same households
located at the foot of the socioracial hierarchy according to a gendered division of
control. Both offer meager and temporary support on condition that recipients
submit to disciplinary monitoring pointing them to the substandard employment
slots of the service economy. Both use the same case-based techniques of
surveillance, moral stigma, the abridgement of privacy, and graduated sanctions to
14 ‘‘The dominant model therefore should not be one of people being taken from ‘the community’ to be
incarcerated out of sight and out of mind until they are released and reintegrated back into society.
Instead, one sees a continual flow of people moving in and out of correctional facilities, some for short
stays and others for long ones, forming various networks that traverse carceral borders and that are
subjected to punitive measures in the domestic and communal spheres’’ (Comfort 2008: 186). This
constant churning of the penalized poor in and out of jail and prison exerts a range of disruptive effects on
all generations inside a household, and particularly on the children of convicts (Foster and Hagan 2007).
616 L. Wacquant
123
‘‘correct’’ wayward behavior.15 Both produce not material improvement and social
incorporation but forced capitulation to extreme precarity and civic liminality as the
normal horizon of life for their clientele. Reentry organizations thus prosper on the
penal side thanks to their organizational isomorphism with workfare on the social
policy side and to their cultural congruence with the moral individualism animating
a political culture that has splintered between a libertarian, laissez-faire attitude
toward those perched at the top, and a paternalist and punitive disposition toward
those trapped at the bottom. By activating the individualist logic of personal
responsibility, post-custodial bureaucracies put the onus of failed ‘‘reintegration’’ on
former convicts, thereby screening out the accelerating degradation of the condition
of the American working class in the ‘‘gloves-off economy’’ which increasingly
consigns them to long-term subemployment and laborious poverty (Kalleberg et al.
2000; Shulman 2005; Bernardt et al. 2008). Lastly, the ceremonial deployment of
reentry programs effectively decouples the web of economic, social, urban, and
justice policies that absolve the prison from the handling of convicts after
incarceration, creating the illusion that the state is not deeply implicated in the entry
of convicts. In so doing, it helps legitimize post-festum the penalization of poverty
and the normalization of social insecurity at the bottom of the class structure.16
To sum up, the so-called Prison Industrial Complex is organizationally
antithetical, not analogous, to its alleged precursor, the Military Industrial Complex;
it composes a negligible part of the contemporary economy, and not one of its central
planks; it does not exploit convict labor or generate self-sustaining profits (except by
way of sideshow), but constitutes a gross fiscal drain; and, far from being
‘‘corporatized,’’ punishment remains a distinctively and mulishly public function of
government. Because it consistently mistakes a political exercise in state-building for
a capitalist quest for profit (stoked by the evils of racism, sexism and imperialism),
PIC supplies no analytic traction on the prison boom in post-Civil rights America and
on the punitive revamping of the neoliberal Leviathan on both the social and penal
fronts. Worse, it blinds us to the colossal economic irrationality and Kafkaesque
bureaucratic absurdity of hyperincarceration. Consequently, we must jettison the
hazy economic metaphor of the ‘‘Prison Reentry Industry’’ and grasp the changing
scale, organization, and effects of programs of post-custodial supervision as the
ceremonial components of a broader refurbishing of the bureaucratic field in its
dealing with the disqualified fractions of the post-industrial working class. Our
theoretical inspiration should come not from Karl Marx and Frantz Fanon but from
Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Pierre Bourdieu, insofar as the contemporary
prison is at core a political institution—a concentrate of material and symbolic
violence—and not an economic outfit or a racial organization. More crucially still,
we should reaffirm our empirical commitment to tracking the phenomenon of
‘‘reentry’’ as it actually unfolds at ground level, that is, not as satanic mills of
punishment for lucre but as a penal morality play and bureaucratic farce.
15 This is amply documented by Sharon Hays’s (2003) and Collins and Mayer’s (2010) lucid accounts of
the workfare policy at ground level. See also the complementary view offered by Watkins-Hayes (2009)
portrait of the new-style welfare bureaucrats at work.
16 Peck and Theodore (2009) show how the ‘‘job developers’’ who funnel ex-convicts toward day-labor
agencies effect this work of normalization in ‘‘Carceral Chicago.’’
Prisoner reentry as myth and ceremony 617
123
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Bernhardt, Annette, Heather Boushey, Laura Dresser and Chris, Tilly. 2008. The gloves-off economy:
Workplace standards at the bottom of America’s labor market. Champaign, IL: Labor and
Employment Relations Association.
Blumstein, Alfred, and Kiminori Nakamura. 2009. Redemption in the presence of widespread criminal
background checks. Criminology 47(2): 327–359.
Boothe, Demico. 2009. Getting out and staying out: A black man’s guide to success after prison.
Memphis, TN: Full Surface Publishing.
Bourdieu, Pierre. [1993] 1994. Rethinking the state: On the genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field,
Sociological Theory 12(1): 1–19.
Bovan, Richard. 2009. The dedicated ex-prisoner’s guide to life and success on the outside: 10 rules for
making it in society after doing time. Memphis, TN: Full Surface Publishing.
Brady, David. 2009. Rich democracies, poor people: How politics explain poverty. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Brewer, Rose M., and Nancy A. Heitzeg. 2008. The racialization of crime and punishment: Criminal
justice, color-blind racism, and the political economy of the prison industrial complex. American
Behavioral Scientist 51(5): 625–644.
Califano, Joseph A. 2009. Shoveling up II: The impact of substance abuse on federal, state and local
budgets. New York: National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University.
Christie, Nils. 1993. Crime control as industry: Toward gulags, Western style? London: Routledge.
Christie, Nils. 2004. Imprisonment, sociological aspects. In: International encyclopedia of the social and
behavioral sciences, eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 7248–7251. London: Pergamon Press.
Cohen, Stanley. 1985. Visions of social control. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Collins, Jane L., and Victoria Mayer. 2010. Both hands tied: Welfare reform and the race to the bottom in
the low-wage labor market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Comfort, Megan. 2007. Punishment beyond the legal offender. Annual Review of Law & Social Science 3:
271–296.
Comfort, Megan. 2008. Doing time together: Love and family in the shadow of the prison. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Davis, Angela. 1998. What is the prison industrial complex? What does it matter. Colorlines: Race,
Culture, Action.
Davis, Angela Y. 2003. Are prisons obsolete? New York: Seven Stories Press.
Davis, Angela, and Cassandra Shaylor. 2001. Race, gender, and the prison industrial complex: California
and beyond. Meridians 2(1): 1–25.
Davis, Mike. 1995. A prison industrial complex: Hell factories in the field. The Nation, 20: 229–234.
Donziger, Marc R. 1996. The prison industrial complex. In: The Real War on Crime, 63–98. New York:
Harper Perennial.
Fairbanks, Robert P. 2009. How it works: Recovering citizens in post welfare Philadelphia. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Foster, Holly, and John Hagan. 2007. Incarceration and intergenerational social exclusion. Social Forces
54, no. 4: 399–433.
Gilmore, Ruth. 2007. Golden gulag: Prisons, surplus, crisis, and opposition in globalizing California.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gilmore, Ruth. 2009. From military industrial complex to prison industrial complex. In: Recording
carceral landscapes, ed. Trevor Paglen, 1–11. Berkeley: The Lef Foundation.
Grattet, Ryken, Joan Petersilia, and Jeffrey Lin. 2008. Parole violations and revocations in California.
Irvine, CA: Center for Evidence-Based Corrections.
Hacker, Jacob S. 2002. The divided welfare state: The battle over public and private social benefits.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Harcourt, Bernard. 2011. The illusion of free markets: Punishment and the myth of natural order.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
618 L. Wacquant
123
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel. 1972. People processing organizations: An exchange approach. American
Sociological Review 37(3): 256–263.
Hays, Sharon. 2003. Flat broke with children: Women in the age of welfare reform. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hattery, Angela, and Earl Smith. 2010. Prisoner re-entry and social capital: The long road to
reintegration. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Herivel, Tara J., and Paul Wright. 2007. Prison profiteers: Who makes money from mass incarceration.
New York: New Press.
Institute of Education Science. 2009. Digest of education statistics, 2009. Washington, DC: National
Center for Education Statistics.
Jackson, Michael B. 2008. How to do good after prison: A handbook for successful reentry (w/
Employment information handbook). PlaceTBD: Joint FX Press.
Juan, E. San, Jr. 2005. Preparing for the time of reparation: Speculative cues from W.E.B. Du Bois,
George Jackson and Mumia Abu-Jamal. Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture &
Society 7(2): 63–74.
Kalleberg, Arne L., Barbara F. Reskin, and Ken Hudson. 2000. Bad jobs in America: Standard and
nonstandard employment relations and job quality in the United States. American Sociological
Review 65(2): 256–278.
Katz, Michael B. 2001. The price of citizenship: Redefining the American welfare state. New York: Owl
Books.
Langan, Patrick and D.J. Levin. 2002. Recidivism of prisoners released in 1994. Washington, DC: Bureau
of Justice Statistics.
McBride, Keally. 2007. Punishment and political order. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal organizations as myth
and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340–363.
Moskos, Charles C., Jr. 1974. The concept of the military-industrial complex: Radical critique or liberal
bogey? Social Problems 21(4): 498–512.
Neubauer, David W. 2005. America’s courts and the criminal justice system. Belmont, CA: Thompson.
Page, Joshua. 2004. Eliminating the enemy: The import of denying prisoners access to higher education in
Clinton’s America. Punishment & Society 6(4): 357–378.
Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2009. Carceral Chicago: Making the ex-offender employability crisis.
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32(2): 251–281.
Petersilia, Joan. 2003. When prisoners come home: Parole and prisoner reentry. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Ross, Jeffrey Ian, and Stephen C. Richards. 2009. Beyond bars: Rejoining society after prison. New York:
Alpha Publishing.
Seiter, RP., and KR. Kadela 2003. Prisoner reentry: What works, what does not, and what is promising.
Crime & Delinquency 49(3): 360–388.
Schlosser, Eric. 1998. The Prison-industrial complex. The Atlantic Monthly 282: 51–77.
Shulman, Beth. 2005. The betrayal of work: How low-wage jobs fail 30 million Americans. New York:
New Press.
Steadman, Henry J., and Michelle Naples. 2005. Assessing the effectiveness of jail diversion programs for
persons with serious mental illness and co-occurring substance use disorders. Behavioral Sciences &
the Law (Special Issue on diversion from the criminal justice system), 23(2): 163–170.
Sudbury, Julia. 2004. A world without prisons: Resisting militarism, globalized punishment and empire.
Social Justice 31(1–2): 9–33.
Thompson, Anthony C. 2008. Releasing prisoners, redeeming communities: Reentry, race, and politics.
New York: New York University Press.
Tonry, Michael. 2000. Fragmentation of sentencing and corrections in America. Alternatives to
Incarceration 6(2): 9–13.
Travis, Jeremy. 2005. But they all come back: Facing the challenges of prisoner reentry. Washington,
DC: Urban Institute Press.
Van Zyl Smit, Dirk and Frieder Dunkel (eds). 1999. Prison labour: Salvation or slavery? International
perspectives. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
Visher, Christy A., and Jeremy Travis. 2003. Understanding individual pathways: Transitions from prison
to community. Annual Review of Sociology 29:89–113.
Wacquant, Loı¨c. 2001. Deadly symbiosis: When ghetto and prison meet and mesh. Punishment & Society
3(1): 95–133.
Prisoner reentry as myth and ceremony 619
123
Wacquant, Loı¨c. 2008. Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press.
Wacquant, Loı¨c. 2009. Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity. Durham and
London: Duke University Press.
Wacquant, Loı¨c. 2010a. Class, race and hyperincarceration in revanchist America. Daedalus (thematic
issue on the challenges of mass incarceration) 140(3): 74–90.
Wacquant, Loı¨c. 2010b. Crafting the neoliberal state: Workfare, prisonfare and social insecurity.
Sociological Forum 25(2): 197–220.
Waisman, Viviana (ed.). 1994. Symposium on the federalization of crime. Hastings Law Journal 46(4).
Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2009. The new welfare bureaucrats: Entanglements of race, class, and policy
reform. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
620 L. Wacquant
123
